Krugman on US Aid to Ukraine and Economic History

Ukraine Aid in the Light of History 

The first title of this Krugman column, from my email version, said "Why aid to Ukraine is so important." No question mark but inescapably a question. 

Can't say I found any clear answer to that question but Krugman does compare usefully US aid to Ukraine now and US aid to Europe during World War 2; so some good history. Take away: Our alliance with Europe is longstanding and immensely important as mutual aid and as a powerful agent for global stability and progress. And has been since at least the World Wars of the last century. 

The main thrust of Krugman's polemic is an econometric refutation of all the MAGA trash talking points thrown around while blocking aid to Ukraine. (Putin now owns a significant propaganda caucus in the US congress!) Or economic attacks, anyway. Ukraine aid drains US budget. In fact, Ukraine aid is less than one-fourth of 1 percent of US GDP.  Europe isn't paying their fair share. In fact, some European states spend a higher percentage of GDP than the US and total aid support between the US and Europe is more or less equal.  Remember, Europe or the European Union includes 27 countries, and taken together it is comparable in size to the US but not separately, of course. 

Anyway, Europe pays their fair share in support of Ukraine, not surprisingly, because they don't want Russian invading them next. They feel this pressure more acutely than North Americans, naturally, although it is one of the most salient features of our age to note that we still seem to be underestimating Putin's invasion of the US. 

The real problem is Europe doesn't have the military industrial capacity Ukraine needs. They can't crank out the weaponry and military hardware like the US or Russia can (with China's help). But they're working on it, Krugman assures us. None of this is reassuring, mind you, but at least this is an explanation that makes some sense.

So, "Why [is] aid to Ukraine is so important"? Because without military aid Ukraine could not defend itself against Russia's invasion and occupation of parts of Ukraine? 

In 1991 Ukraine won its independence in a referendum, 84 percent of eligible voters turned out and 90 percent endorsed Ukraine's independence; including voters from the Crimea and the eastern parts now occupied by Russia.  

From United Nations Charter of 1945, 

Article 2 (4) of the Charter prohibits the threat or use of force and calls on all Members to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of other States. 

Russia uses, is using right now, and has been using since 2014, at the very least, force to flagrantly disregard Ukraine's "sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence." 

Another reason the NATO alliance is important is as a coalition of states willing to defend the UN Charter. Some people try to blame the war on NATO expansion; even Chomsky and some leftists. Besides, again, basically doing more of Putin's dirty business, this take fails to mention NATO expands only to independent states already resisting Russia's invasive kleptocratic threat to their sovereign independence.

(Recall: Overthrow of Putin puppet leader in Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, in 2013, triggers Russia's invasion and takeover of the Crimea and eastern sections of Ukraine. Yanukovynch's chief political handler, Paul Manafort, was Trump's campaign manager in the 2016 election, and an obvious Russian asset, caught giving insider polling data to Russian intelligence attacking the US election for their candidate, convicted for some crimes related to these activities but was then pardoned by Trump. In short, again, all roads lead to Putin and Trump as the biggest Benedict Arnold betrayal in American history.) 

America could, of course, be better about respecting the independence and self-determination of neighboring countries, especially to our south in Mexico and Latin America. No doubt. If such stories interest you, try four critical histories of US national security and foreign intelligence gathering, more or less in historical order: Jonathan Katz's Gangsters of Capitalism (1890s-1940s), Vincent Bevins' The Jakarta Method (1980s-1990s), Spencer Ackerman's Reign of Terror (2001 to 2010s), and Tim Weiner's Legacy of Ashes (post-WW2). A numbing parade of American imperialist misadventures, unmasking realpolitiks from the Spanish-American War to the Cold War to the War on Terror, and always the CIA mixed up in the worst of it.

For all the spycraft and espionage and anti-communist death squads, though, invading and occupying other countries has been a red line largely and effectively frowned on by the UN and international community since 1945. This normative deterrence has held up more or less for over a half a century or until Putin decided it was the mission of his life to rebuild the Russian Empire, going on offense after 9/11.

Empires are not supposed to exist in a post-colonial world, by the way. Or if they do they're supposed to be based on trade and financial power (Neo-Imperialsim) and not on military force; or this is the gist of the Bretton Woods system setup after WW2, at any rate. 

Meanwhile, back in the USSR, and Putin's fantasy of a Greater Russian Empire, military power and political tyranny rule everything. And this is more or less the MAGA fantasy as well, right? You might think someone in Russia would suggest that there is more economic gain in trading with their neighbors than fighting them for political control but violent autocracy, dictatorship, and political tyranny runs deep in Russian history. 

And we'll find out this coming November how deep in this country.